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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP1. Introduction
A dedicated G20 macroeconomic work
stream has been established to conduct
thorough analysis of the roots of the cri-
sis and lessons to be learnt to lay down
sound foundations for economic recovery
and avoid crises of this scale in the futu-
re. Its scope is also to identify policy res-
ponses required to deal with the fallout
of the real economy, address national
needs while enabling an open global
economy and international cooperation,
and to lay the foundations for sustainable
recovery.
This briefing note speaks directly to the
work of the macroeconomic work stream.
Its scope also covers issues of relevance
to another G20 working group that deals
with Multilateral Development Banks. The
issues pertain to the leveraging of interna-
tional development resources to meet
poverty and growth challenges, especially
for low-income countries.
Most African banks and other financial
activities were not affected directly by the
first round effects of the financial crisis
due to lack of exposure to international
credit markets. However, most countries,
including Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, South
Africa and other members of the
Common Monetary Area (Lesotho,
Swaziland and Namibia) experienced real
currency depreciation as investors moved
their positions from emerging markets. In
addition, another immediate visible
impact of the crisis on African countries,
which is likely to have a long-term
impact, is the decline in prices of commo-
dities such as oil, copper, gold, platinum
as well as wheat and maize. This decline
in commodity prices has already been felt
in many countries through widening of
current account deficits and a drop in
reserves.
In terms of the second round effects, the
spill over of the crisis to the real economy
in developed countries has pushed many
countries into a recession, which is having
a visible impact on Africa through demand
for African exports and investment. Trade
performance is affected further by lack of
financing due to liquidity shortage in the
financial sector as investors move away
from Africa and other emerging markets.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
forecasts show a fall in global trade
volumes amounting to 4.1 percent in 2009
and Africa is expected to be seriously
affected.
All these factors will have serious implica-
tions on African countries through employ-
ment and growth, which undermines the
1fight against poverty and progress
towards meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
However, recent developments in the glo-
bal economy present some opportunities
to African countries in terms of lower oil
and food prices, which have had a huge
impact on current account deficits, infla-
tion as well as humanitarian effects such
as hunger.
The aim of this briefing note is to highlight
major effects of the crisis on African coun-
tries with emphasis on trade financing.
The analysis provides input for ministers
and governors to deliberate on the ability
of African countries to withstand potential
effects from the financial crisis through
targeted policy responses, including inno-
vative instruments to mobilize domestic
resources to meet the growing financing
gap.
2. Managing First Round
Effects
In the early days of the banking crisis, a
lot of reference was made to “decoupling”,
that Africa would not be directly impacted
by the current banking crisis due to its
weak integration into the global economy.
African capital markets are the smallest in
the world and account for less than two
percent of the global stock market capita-
lization and less than one percent of glo-
bal debt securities and bank assets.
Besides South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt,
most African economies are marginal reci-
pients of portfolio flows which, compared
to foreign direct investment, are subject to
high volatility. For countries like South
Africa, the main concern is the financing
of the large current account deficit which
has largely depended on short-tem capital
flows.
Prior to the financial crisis, Africa was
experiencing a substantial increase in
financial flows driven by higher yield and
improved risk assessments. However, the
crisis has prompted the withdrawal of
international investors from domestic debt
and capital markets in Africa, resulting in
a downturn in African stock exchanges.
Already, stock markets in Egypt, South
Africa and East Africa have experienced
high volatility, and stock values have fel-
len. In South Africa, for example, the
stock exchange lost 27 percent between
January 2007 and December 2008, while
Egypt and Mauritius lost about 37 percent
and 59 percent of their market values,
respectively, in the same period.
Similarly, many currencies experienced
steep depreciation, which will increase the
burden of debt for countries servicing debt
in local currency. All African currencies
depreciated, against the United States
dollar, except those of Angola, Liberia and
Sao Tome and Principe from the end of
2July to the end of November 2008(1) . The
worst affected currencies during this per-
iod were those of Seychelles (110 per-
cent), followed by the D.R. Congo, South
Africa and rand-linked currencies of
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (about
34 percent each). Zambia and Ghana
also experienced some significant depre-
ciation of their currencies, at 28 percent
and 26 percent, respectively. More
recently, some countries have recorded a
recovery in currency values against the
hard currencies. Most of the apprecia-
tions took place during the last week of
November 2008, with South Africa lea-
ding at 6.5 percent. The Euro linked cur-
rencies of the CFA Zone appreciated by
about 3 percent during the same period
while the Zambian kwacha and Kenya
shilling appreciated by 2.1 percent and
1.8 percent, respectively.
More pronounced has been the impact of
the crisis on the prices of commodities
such as oil, copper, nickel, coal, platinum,
gold, coffee, cocoa and others. From a
peak of US$140 per barrel in July 2008,
the price of oil declined to about US$40 in
December 2008, less than half the price
of nearly US$100 per barrel in November
2007 (Figure 1). For most commodity
exporting countries such as Nigeria (Box
1), this translates into a large loss in reve-
nue, while for net oil-importing countries,
the gains are reflected in the easing of
inflationary pressure and lower current
account deficits.
Overall, currencies and stock prices
continue to be volatile though there are
signs that markets may be stabilizing.
Similarly, commodity prices remain vola-
tile and unpredictable and this is likely to
affect African countries that are heavily
dependant on commodity exports. Thus
the issue of diversification of African eco-
nomies remains crucial for growth.
3. Impact on the Real Sector
As the problems in the financial sector in
the United States and Europe spread to
the real economy, concerns are moun-
ting regarding the adverse impact on
developing economies, in general, and
African countries, in particular. The criti-
cal challenge is to restore confidence in
the financial system – a key ingredient to
proper functioning of the financial system
– and liquidity to keep an adequate level
of private sector lending for investment
and consumption.
The effects of the financial crisis on Africa
are not one-dimensional. They interact
with each country’s prevailing macro-eco-
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(1)Analysis excludes Zimbabwe which has been experiencing economic problems not related to the financial
crisis.4
Box 1:
Nigeria government undertakes vigorous response to the financial crisis
Nigerian financial markets are already feeling the hit of the global financial crisis in
many respects. International hedge funds managers had taken as much as USD
10 billion out of the country by mid October; Nigerian banks saw their credit lines
shrink rapidly (e.g., letters of credit); and for new initiatives such as the Nigeria
Infrastructure Fund prospects for funding have faded away.
The stock market has suffered a major setback, with the all-share index declining
from 52,916 in July 2008 to 28,986 as of December 9, 2008. This reverses a trend
where the index had nearly doubled during the period of January 2007 (at 33163)
to March 2008. Market capitalization has declined by 6 percent from January to
October 2008.
In response to the crisis the Nigerian Government has undertaken a series of mea-
sures to address the adverse impact of the crisis on the financial markets. A
Presidential Advisory Panel was set up to monitor the events and advise the
government on appropriate responses. The Stock Exchange Commission stepped
in by setting up two expert panels to deal with issues of governance and opera-
tions. The Central Bank introduced major innovations in its instruments including: a
reduction of the policy rate from 10.25 percent to 9.27 percent; a reduction of the
cash reserve ratio from 4 percent to 2 percent and the liquidity ratio from 40 per-
cent to 30 percent; it injected an equivalent of $1.27 billion in the system in
October 2008 to shore up liquidity. These measures have been instrumental in
maintaining confidence in the financial system and sustain private lending.
Meanwhile the decline in the price of oil created serious problems for public
finances. In October 2008, the Government was forced to adjust the benchmark
oil price to US$45 per barrel, down from $62.5 for the purpose of the 2009
Appropriation Bill. Now even the US$45 per barrel seems optimistic. This drop in
oil revenue will continue to force substantial tightening in many areas of govern-
ment spending in the coming year.nomic context. The briefing note sketches
generic real sector impact of the crisis for
a typology of countries according to their
common characteristics with some evi-
dence drawn from different sources, inclu-
ding AfDB financial crisis monitoring
reports, country briefs as well as IMF
research, the World Bank and other insti-
tutions. However, one can identify five dis-
tinct real economy transmission channels.
First, access to international and
domestics capital markets, through
bond issues, become more costly as liqui-
dity tightens. This has a direct impact on
the costs of large infrastructure invest-
ment projects such as dams, roads, rail-
roads and electricity generating plants,
among others. Countries that had planned
to issue sovereign bonds, such as
Uganda and Kenya, have been forced to
delay these plans due to unfavourable pri-
cing in the international capital markets.
Similarly, banks that have relied on credit
lines from the international capital markets
may have to scale back operations and
seek alternative sources of financing,
such as regional development banks like
the African Development Bank. Unless
cheaper resources can be found elsewhe-
re, large infrastructure projects are at risk
of being suspended as domestic
resources become more expensive.
Second, the recent increase in Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) flows is not likely
to be sustained due to the recession in
developed countries which are the major
source of capital. A slowdown in FDI will
have serious implications on economic
growth in Africa as FDI flows have been a
major driver of recent economic perfor-
mance on the continent. This decline in
private capital inflows will affect capital
intensive infrastructure projects in the
medium-to-long term. Overall, according
to World Bank estimates, private flows to
developing countries are projected to
decline from US$1 trillion in 2007 to
around US$530 billion in 2009 (or from
7.7 to 3.0 percent of developing country
GDP).
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Box 2: The Kenyan market experience
The two-year bond of Kenya Shilling (Kshs) 6 billion was under-subscribed by
45 percent compared to a subscription rate of 161 percent of the last one-year
bond issue on 23 November 2008. The Central Bank of Kenya, has announced
that the threshold for investments in Treasury Bills in the primary market will be
reduced from the current Kshs 1 million to Kshs 100,000.00 from the beginning
of January 2009. This should help mobilize more domestic resources.On the whole, weaker investment confi-
dence is making access to finance more
difficult as banks and investors take a
more cautious approach, further reducing
lending to the private sector. Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are particu-
larly affected by worsening credit condi-
tions. In normal times, market failures and
peculiarities of SMEs lead to a sub-opti-
mal allocation of credit to SMEs. In an
economic downturn, these effects are
amplified by the regulatory framework for
banking intermediation, which represents
the point of reference for bank prudential
supervision in African countries. Reduced
access to domestic capital for SMEs will
have an impact on employment creation
and poverty reduction.
A third notable impact on the continent’s
real sector will depend on the extent of
the crisis’ impact on Africa’s trading
partners. In that sense, the countries that
will be most rapidly affected will be those
with substantial links with the United
States. This is applies to Nigeria, whose
trade with the United States accounts for
more than half of its total trade (52 per-
cent). For most African countries, their pri-
mary trading partners are in Europe and
increasingly in Asia (mainly China).
Already, expected growth rates in Europe
and Asia have been revised to -0.5 per-
cent and 7.1 percent, respectively. African
exports will, therefore, decline as the
financial crisis spreads to the real sector
in key markets, resulting in weaker
demand for primary commodities.
It should be recognized that the overall
impact of the crisis on Africa will depend
on the sectoral composition of exports. For
example, countries like Ghana have not
been affected by the crisis because the
main export is cocoa, a commodity which
is still enjoying relatively high prices. In
Lesotho’s case, however, although total
exports have increased, recent data show
that exports in the manufacturing sector,
which are driven by clothing and textiles
exports, have started declining again in
2008 after the downturn as a result of the
end of the Multi Fibre Agreement in 2005.
For a small and poor country like Lesotho,
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Box 3: Impact of the crisis on FDI in Egypt
FDI plunged by 44 percent in December 2008, compared to the corresponding
period of the previous financial year. Meanwhile, portfolio outflows increased to
US$3.5 billion against US$1.4 billion over the same period last year, with forei-
gn investments in Egyptian treasury bills representing 90 percent of these out-
flows.this type of disruption to the economy will
have far-reaching consequences on efforts
at reducing poverty.
The tourism sector is also likely to
contract as a result of the financial crisis,
especially in Kenya, Tanzania, South
Africa, Mauritius, Egypt, Tunisia and
Morocco, which had experienced substan-
tial increases in tourism activity in recent
years. Tourism sectors in Egypt and
Mauritius have already been hit by the cri-
sis as the number of tourists from develo-
ped countries continues to decrease. In
Egypt, tourism booking indicators for the
winter season are down by 40 percent
compared to the same period last year.
Therefore, the success of these countries
in diversifying their sources of export ear-
nings may be severely undermined by a
global recession.
Furthermore, the impact on trade will be
felt through the liquidity constraint which
has already had an impact on trade
financing, especially in the case of short-
term shipping contracts. Given that 60
percent of trade finance is handled by pri-
vate agents and 90 per cent of the US$14
trillion worth of trade is financed by trade
credits, the impact of further market tigh-
tening could have dire consequences on
trade performance. Analysis by the World
Trade Organization shows that the liquidi-
ty shortage and disproportionate aversion
to risk has led to a shortfall in available
trade finance of about US$25 billion, dis-
rupting therefore trade and growth perfor-
mance, and possibly exacerbating the
effects of the crisis.
At the microeconomic level, firms involved
in foreign trade may run into difficulties in
maintaining their production and trade
activities due to the lack of access to low-
cost foreign currency denominated wor-
king capital. At the macro-economic level,
the loss of liquidity in the trade sector,
forces importers and exporters to obtain
spot foreign exchange to make necessary
payments and service debt falling due,
thereby increasing demand in the foreign
exchange market. It may also reduce the
supply of spot foreign exchange, given
increased probability of delayed receipts
of foreign exchange earnings from
exports and a decline in exports that
depend on imported inputs and materials.
The resulting pressure on exchange rates
may compound the country’s external
debt and payment difficulties and increase
country risk, leading to further cutbacks in
all funding, including trade finance.
Finally, the scarcity of trade credit hinders
potential export stimulus from exchange
rate depreciation that accompanies the
crisis, impeding economic adjustment and
recovery. Thus, these negative externali-
ties associated with sharp contractions in
trade finance have damaging effects on
the trade sector that extend to the wider
economy.
7Lastly, an important and growing source
of household income in Africa is workers
remittances, estimated last year at about
US$25 billion and, in some countries,
these remittances outstrip FDI inflows
(Figure 2). The World Bank estimates that
remittance flows into developing coun-
tries, including Africa, are expected to
decline from 1.8 percent of recipient coun-
try GDP in 2008 to 1.6 percent in 2009.
The main concern is that unlike other
transfers, remittances are directly chan-
nelled to households and are used for
family recurrent expenditures, such as
food consumption, medical “out-of-pocket”
expenditures and education for children.
The financial crisis, which has slumped
key developed countries into a recession
will therefore lead to a slowdown in remit-
tances as demand for unskilled labour
declines in order to protect domestic jobs.
Some developed countries may react by
putting restrictions on migrations. In
Africa, a slump in commodity prices such
as gold, platinum and diamond has also
affected demand for labour which has
resulted in lay-offs of migrant workers
from neighbouring countries.
In South Africa, approximately 32,000
mining workers were retrenched in the
third quarter of 2008 after the sudden
downturn in metal prices in the second
half of the year, putting pressure on remit-
tances in the case of workers from
Lesotho.
The major concern in terms of the impact
of the financial crisis on the real economy
is the adverse effect on domestic
demand, namely consumption, invest-
ment, exports and government spending.
Any substantial decline in domestic
demand will reduce income which will, in
turn, affect employment and, consequent-
ly, growth. A reduction in growth will there-
fore reverse the modest gains made
regarding poverty reduction over the past
years. Africa is already doing poorly both
in absolute and relative terms with regard
to poverty. Further reduction in output will
therefore make the poverty situation dra-
matically worse.
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Box 4: Remittances some country experiences
In the case of Egypt, for example, remittances represent more than 32 percent of the total
service receipt in the balance of payments account, while in Lesotho and Uganda remit-
tances account for 60 percent and 40 percent of export earnings, respectively. Workers
remittance flows in Kenya for 2008, for example, are expected to exceed those for 2007. The
total flows during the first 11 months of 2008 to November amounted to about US$ 570,000
compared to US$ 573,000 for the whole of 2007. However, remittances since July 2008,
except for October, are significantly smaller when compared to flows over the same period in
2007. This may point to lower remittance flows in 2009.4. Next Steps
Cyclicality is part of the free-market eco-
nomy. It is important for Africa and the
international community to be wary of pro-
tectionist sentiment and related policy res-
ponses and the reallocation of resources
away from ODA commitments to develo-
ping countries. Nevertheless, African
countries have an opportunity to learn
important lessons from this crisis and act
pragmatically. Going forward, intervention
should include policies to support domes-
tic resource mobilization - public and pri-
vate - to support planned government
investment and to reinvigorate the private
sector. On the global level, there is need
for more pressure for the international




The financial crisis is expected to reduce
external sources of financing for African
development, including FDI, portfolio
investments, remittances and trade cre-
dits. Compounding this situation are the
challenges created by the financial crisis
in raising the levels of domestic resource
mobilization in Africa. For example, tax
revenue in oil exporting countries has
already declined with the dramatic fall in
oil prices since July 2008. Similarly, royal-
ties from the mining sector have dropped,
especially for existing flexible and new
contracts, as commodity prices are also
falling. Also, in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis, strengthened risk control by
banks will increase their probability of
rejecting good investment proposals.
Thus, it is imperative that African coun-
tries strengthen their capacity for domes-
tic resource mobilization, if the continent
is to sustain the remarkable growth it has
enjoyed in recent years.
What should African countries consider?
The low level of financial sector develop-
ment in Africa certainly raises the urgency
of the financial sector and fiscal reforms.
This is key to ensuring the existence of
the necessary internal conditions for
mobilizing development resources. In the
financial sector, emphasis should be on
the establishment of property rights,
contract enforcement mechanisms and
laws ensuring creditors’ rights. Banking
supervision authorities should also seek
ways of encouraging banks to lend to
SMEs as these have been proven to have
a large impact on employment and the
diversification of production. SMEs are an
important component of the economic
foundation for sustained job creation and
poverty reduction.
Further, developing an efficient domestic
bond market will help in the development
9of public bond markets as well as stock
markets. Moreover, African countries are
encouraged to deepen reforms in order to
broaden the tax base and combat tax
evasion. Introducing funded pension
schemes will also help African countries
improve resource mobilization. Debt
management should also be part of the
priorities going forward, especially for
countries that have suffered currency
depreciation in light of foreign currency
denominated debt. Domestic resource
mobilization should also entail increased
importance on improving resource effi-
ciency and public financial management.
Progress on the Doha Trade Round
At the global level, the resumption of the
Doha Trade Round remains critical to sti-
mulating the global economy. History indi-
cates that recessions or cyclical slow-
downs often coincide with an increase of
protectionist trade policy. This is not only
the case for the European Union and the
United States, but also for emerging BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and
China). Africa - like other developing
countries - stands to lose from increased
protectionism in developed countries as
well as a decline in their demand for
exports from Africa, a situation which
would have an adverse impact on econo-
mic growth and poverty reduction.
Countries should also make progress on
Aid for Trade in order to address internal
supply side constraints to support the
trade liberalization agenda. Key areas in
this agenda include trade policy and regu-
lation, trade-related infrastructure, trade
related adjustment and capacity building,
among others. However, it should be
noted that Aid for Trade should be viewed
as a complement to the Doha Round and
not a substitute.
African countries should seize the oppor-
tunity presented by the crisis to continue
deepening their unilateral reforms which
can later be locked into the multilateral
framework as bargaining chips. In addi-
tion, African countries should explore
viable bilateral trade agreements with
other Asian and Latin American develo-
ping countries. It is also important to bear
in mind that the current financial crisis
highlights the risks of becoming overly-
dependent on foreign export markets for
domestic economic growth. The risk of
export dependency could be mitigated by
boosting intra-African trade to reduce
market concentration. This “within the
continent” growth strategy will comple-
ment existing export channels to the
European Union, America and Asia.
Further, given the status of intra-African
trade, African countries should increase
momentum in addressing constraints that
impede progress, going forward. This
entails addressing critical issues such as
overlapping membership and improving
trade facilitation.
10Realizing Commitments to Increase
Development Assistance and Aid
Effectiveness
African commitment to pursue pragmatic
policy reforms is not enough.
Development partners have an opportuni-
ty to complement pragmatic policy
reforms by leveraging commitments made
at the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit, des-
pite the financial crisis. While the commit-
ments are still to be fulfilled, this event
saw world leaders from industrial coun-
tries pledge an additional US$25 billion
per year to Africa by 2010. Paradoxically,
the size and speed of the bail-out in deve-
loped countries, exceeding US$950 bil-
lion, approved in a matter of days,
appears to dwarf the resources needed to
achieve the MDGs and reduce poverty. A
move, by development partners, to adopt
policies leading to lower disbursements
as the fiscal situation tightens, would be
regrettable.
Committing to these pragmatic policies by
both African countries and their develop-
ment partners will not only reduce the
impact of current financial crisis, but will
also lay the foundation for long-term equi-
table growth and sustained poverty reduc-
tion efforts. Donors such as the European
Union have reaffirmed their pledge to
meet the Gleneagles commitment despite
the crisis. The recent G20 communiqué
underscored the importance of the
Monterrey agreement on ownership and
resource mobilization in order for coun-
tries to make progress towards meeting
the MDGs.
The aid effectiveness agenda should also
consistently follow the Accra High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness Action Plan.
The key actions agreed in Accra include
improving predictability of aid flows, sup-
porting ownership of interventions by
developing countries, increasing the use
of country systems, streamlining the use
of conditionality, untying aid, reducing
fragmentation of aid and strengthening
partnerships in the spirit of the Paris
Declaration principles.
5. Possible Responses by the
AfDB and other MDBs
The AfDB and other MDBs can help
African countries through targeted inter-
ventions with a deliberate move to mitiga-
te procyclicality. Two important targets
that are within the reach of MDBs are: (1)
offsetting the decline in government reve-
nues linked to falling trade volume; and
(2) compensating the decline in loanable
funds in the banking sector. The first tar-
get can be achieved through budget sup-
port while the second can be achieved
through the provision of support to com-
mercial and development banks notably
11by offering lines of credit and financing
innovative projects in support of long-term
private sector lending.
Further, the AfDB and other MDBs should
consider establishing or strengthening
trade finance facilities to address the
issues that have emerged from the liquidi-
ty constraints, reducing letters of credit
needed by importers and exporters to
move goods. Specific products to mitigate
procyclicality include the introduction of
emergency liquidity facilities, loan guaran-
tee products, portfolio restructuring, sup-
porting the development of sound domes-
tic debt markets in Africa through the
creation of the African domestic bond fund
(ADBF)(2).
The Bank should leverage its position and
superior knowledge of country-specific
environments to attract other financiers.
Indeed, intervention by the Bank provides
not only finance, but also the much-nee-
ded stamp of approval of the feasibility of
projects with regard to political and finan-
cial risk.
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Box: 5 The African Domestic Bond Fund
The ADBF will be invested in local currency denominated sovereign African bonds
and it will be initially funded by the AfDB and African Central Banks. The specific
objectives of this instrument are: (i) to reduce African countries’ dependence on
foreign currency denominated debt; (ii) to encourage the deepening of Domestic
Bond Markets through investments in longer dated assets; and (iii) to contribute to
enlarging the investor base in African Domestic Bond Markets.
(2)The activities of AFMI will be organized around the following components: i) the creation of an African
Financial Markets Database; and ii) the creation of an African Domestic Bond Fund. Potential participants in
AFMI include international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the BIS and the OECD.
Also, regional Institutions such as the Association of African Central Banks, the African Central Banks
themselves, and a variety of experts from both, the public and private sector will take part in AFMI.13
Questions for Ministers and Governors to consider
• What instruments are in place for African countries to address issues related
to trade financing (i.e. trade finance facilities)?
• What are the adjustment mechanisms or social safety nets available to
support sectors (i.e. mining and manufacturing) that have been affected and
how do governments plan to address the problem of workers who have been
laid off?
• Which types of instruments are available for increasing domestic resource
mobilization (i.e. bond market developments, taxation)?
• What types of assistance are Ministers and Governors expecting from
institutions such as the AfDB, UNECA and the AU?14
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